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THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
CAPITAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW
JAMES S. COLEMAN*
This paper examines some of the ways in which social
capital is created and destroyed in modern society, as well as
the relation of these processes to the law. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of the way rights are allocated by law
and the implications of these legal allocations for various
forms of social capital.
The first question which must be answered is what is
meant by "social capital." The concepts of financial capital,
physical capital, and human capital are well known, but the
idea of social capital requires some explanation. Perhaps the
best way to illustrate this concept is to report on the results
of some recent research on schools that has stimulated my
interest in what I have called "social capital."
Over the course of the past several years, I have con-
ducted research on the impact of public and private high
schools on students attending those schools. My colleagues
and I examined public schools, Catholic schools, and other,
mostly non-religious, private schools using a national sample
of over a thousand high schools. We first examined the scores
of students from each type of school on standardized tests
and arrived at the conclusion that private schools, particu-
larly Catholic schools, produced somewhat higher achieve-
ment scores in verbal and mathematical skills (though not in
science) than did the public schools. That is, achievement was
higher not merely among the students as they existed in the
public and private sectors, but even if the Catholic schools
had the same distribution of students found in the public
schools, the average achievement of students in Catholic
schools would be higher. Although these conclusions pro-
voked extensive controversy (which I will not review here),
other differences between the schools dwarf the differences
in achievement.
The most dramatic difference is seen in dropout rates,
for the difference in dropout rates is not between public
schools and private schools, but between Catholic schools on
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the one hand and private and public schools on the other.
The difference in the overall rates is shown in Figure 1,
where the bars represent the proportion of students drop-
ping out between the spring of their sophomore year and the
spring of their senior year. The rate of dropouts in the Cath-
olic schools is less than a fourth of that in the public schools
and less than a third of that in the other private schools.
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CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
As yet, social capital has not been defined as promised.
In fact, rather than exploring what is meant by social capital,
I seem to have cluttered the cognitive landscape by introduc-
ing irrelevant empirical information. The idea of social capi-
tal enters when one begins to account for these results. Why
should the dropout rate be so low in Catholic schools when
the students, though from somewhat more advantaged back-
grounds on average than public school students, are from less
advantaged backgrounds than students in other private
schools? What accounts for the difference between Catholic
schools and the other private schools?
In answering this question, one might suspect that some-
thing about the religious community surrounding the school
might be implicated. Most of the other schools are what one
traditionally thinks of as "independent schools," although
some of the non-Catholic private schools studied had a nomi-
nal religious affiliation, such as Friends schools or schools
with an Episcopalian foundation. A few of the schools were
religiously-based schools with a religiously homogeneous stu-
dent body, including two Jewish schools, two Baptist schools,
and schools representing various other denominations. If
one's initial intuition about the role of the religious commu-
nity is correct, and there is nothing unique about Catholic
students or Catholic schools, the religiously-affiliated schools
with a religiously homogeneous student body should exhibit
dropout rates similar to those in Catholic schools. High drop-
out rates should be confined to private schools which draw
students on an individual basis, and not as part of any social
community surrounding the school.
The results of the study confirmed our intuitions, as the
low dropout rate of Catholic schools is nearly matched by
that of the other schools serving children of a religious com-
munity. It is the independent schools, or those with a reli-
gious foundation but a heterogeneous student body, which
have higher dropout rates. This is shown in Figure 2.
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PROPORTION DROPOUT Figure 2
CATHOLIC OTHER OTHER
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A second implication of a religious community effect is
that Catholic students in public schools should not parallel
the low dropout rates found in Catholic schools. The dropout
rate should be something associated with the school and not
an aspect of Catholocism per se.
Figure 3 shows that the second implication is largely true as
well, for the principal difference was not between Catholic
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and non-Catholic students, but
the other schools.
between Catholic schools and













The religious community surrounding a religiously-based
school therefore appears to have some effect in keeping stu-
dents in high school until graduation. One may think of this
community as a form of social capital supporting both the
schools and the youth within those schools.
There is further evidence supporting this conjecture. If
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most proximate form of social capital available to children,
one may inquire about the dropout rates among children for
whom this form of social capital is weakest. Even when the
human capital and financial capital within the family are
great, one may analyze the dropout rate among children
whose parents are well-educated and produce adequate in-
come but are weak in the relationships that go to make up a
family. Figure 4 shows the dropout rates among children who
live in single-parent households. Similar charts are available
for children both of whose parents have worked since before
the child was in school, and children who report little talk
with parents about personal matters. For children with defi-
ciencies in familial social capital, such as the children of sin-
gle-parent households, children whose parents have both
worked before the child was in school, and children who re-
port little communication with their parents on personal mat-
ters, the dropout rate is somewhat higher than for children
without these deficiencies.
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The likelihood of children dropping out increases as the
number of deficiencies in family social capital increases. As in
the case of the community surrounding the school, the social
capital possessed by the family appears to provide a support
for the young person's remaining in school. Families without
this social capital but with the human and financial capital
that makes them above average in socio-economic status (that
is, education and income) are the families from which the
phenomenon known as "middle class dropout" arises.
One final empirical question may be asked to provide
further insight into how these two forms of social capital, the
family surrounding the child and the community surrounding
the school, function. What about children from families with
deficiencies in social capital in Catholic schools as compared
to those in public or other private schools (schools which dif-
fer in the community social capital surrounding the school)?
PROPORTION DROPOUT Figure 5
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Figure 5 shows that the difference in likelihood of dropping
out for children with and for those without the family defi-
ciency is much lower in Catholic schools than in public or
other private schools. The social capital in the religious com-
munity surrounding the school appears especially effective
for those children lacking strong social capital within the
family.
To this point, social capital has been defined by example;
implicitly as the relations that exist among parents of stu-
dents in a school, but explicitly defining it by its effects. The
justification for calling it social capital rather than merely so-
cial relations or social networks or community lies in pre-
cisely these effects; that is, social capital is a resource which
aids students in remaining in high school and aids schools in
achieving their goals of educating and graduating these stu-
dents. It is useful, however, to be a little more explicit about
how such social capital operates. In doing so, I will depart
from statistical evidence, and rely instead on causal and quali-
tative observations. Prior to embarking on an analysis of how
social capital operates, it may be useful to review briefly the
idea of human capital to sharpen the distinction between
human and social capital.
Human Capital and Social Capital
Probably the most important and most original develop-
ment in the economics of education over the past thirty years
has been the idea that the concept of physical capital, such as
that embodied in tools, machines, and other productive
equipment, can be extended to include human capital as well.
Just as physical capital is created by working with materials to
create tools which facilitate production, human capital is cre-
ated by working with persons to produce in them skills and
capabilities which make them more productive. Schools con-
stitute a central institution for the creation of human capital,
and just as decisions made on investment in physical capital
are based on the expected rates of return on these invest-
ments, it is useful to conceive of educational decisions as be-
ing made on the basis of the expected rates of return on in-
vestments in human capital.
Social capital, though no less important, is something
quite different from human capital. If physical capital is
wholly tangible, being embodied in observable material prod-
ucts, and human capital is less tangible, being embodied in
the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual, social cap-
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ital is still less tangible, for it exists in the relations between
persons. Social capital, like physical and human capital, facili-
tates productive activity. For example, trust is a form of so-
cial capital. A group within which there is extensive trustwor-
thiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more
than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and
trust.
The distinction between human capital and social capital
can be exhibited by diagrams used by analysts of social net-
works. In a diagram like Figure 6, the human capital resides
in the nodes and the social capital resides in the lines con-
necting the nodes, with four persons represented by the sym-
bols A, B, C, and D. Social capital and human capital are
often complementary, such that if B is a child and A is an
adult parent of the child, then, in order for A to be useful in
the cognitive development of B, there must be capital in both
the node and the link - the human capital held by A and
social capital in the existence of the relation between A and
B.
Certain kinds of social capital arise only in networks with
a high degree of closure. In a network like that of Figure 6,
the existence of relations between A, B, C, and D means that
two can discuss a third's behavior and develop a consensus
about what is proper or appropriate behavior. This process
leads to the development of social norms. For example, if A
and D are parents of B and C, respectively, A and D can de-




A Network with Closure
Thus, the social capital that exists in religious communi-
ties surrounding a religious school resides at least in part in
the norms and sanctions that grow in such communities.
These norms and sanctions in turn depend upon both the so-
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cial relations and the closure of networks created by these
relations.
Social Capital in the Family
Families obviously differ in human capital, such as the
number of years of parental education, and children are
strongly affected by the human capital possessed by their par-
ents. Human capital can be irrelevant to outcomes for chil-
dren, however, if parents are not an important part of their
children's lives or if their human capital is employed exclu-
sively at work or elsewhere outside the home. The social cap-
ital of the family is the relation between children and parents
(and, when families include other members, relationships
with them as well). That is, if the human capital possessed by
parents is not complemented by the social capital embodied
in family relations, the human capital of the parents becomes
irrelevant to the child's educational growth.
The biographies of well-known persons offer striking ex-
amples of the importance of social capital in the family. Ber-
trand Russell once stated that he had no greater endowments
than many others, but that his grandmother, who engaged
him in extensive discussions on intellectual matters when he
was a child, made the difference. Assuming that his statement
contains some truth, it is evident that the major difference
between Bertrand Russell's childhood and that of others was
not the intellectual resources possessed by his grandmother,
but the use of those resources in extended interaction with
the boy.
Another example is that of John Stuart Mill, who, at an
age before most children attend school, had been taught
Latin and Greek by his father, James Mill. Later in childhood
Mill would discuss drafts of his father's manuscripts with Jer-
emy Bentham and his father. John Stuart Mill probably had
no extraordinary genetic endowments; and his father's learn-
ing was no more extensive than that of some other men of
the time. The crucial difference was the time and effort the
father spent with the child on intellectual matters.
A third example is from contemporary America. In a
public school district where the students' families purchased
the texts used for school, the school authorities were sur-
prised to discover that a number of Asian immigrant families
purchased two copies of the textbook needed by the child. An
investigation showed that the family purchased the second
copy for the mother to study in order to maximally help her
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child do well in school. Here is a case in which the human
capital of the parents, at least as measured traditionally by
years of schooling, is low, but the social capital in the family
available for the child's education is extremely high.
It is the absence of social capital within the family that I
have labelled "deficiencies" in the family. The physical ab-
sence of family members may be called a structural deficiency.
Single parent families and families in which the mother
worked before the child entered elementary school represent
two forms of structural deficiency. The nuclear family itself
can be seen as structurally deficient, for it lacks the social
capital which comes with the presence of grandparents, aunts
or uncles in or near the household.
Functional deficiency in the family refers to the absence
of strong relations between children and parents despite the
physical presence of the family members in the household
and the opportunity for strong relations. Functional deficien-
cies may result from the child's embeddedness in a youth
community, from the parents' embeddedness in relationships
with other adults which do not cross generations, or from
other sources. Whatever the source, the child does not profit
from the human capital of the parents because the social cap-
ital is absent. The resources exist in node A of the diagram
of Figure 6, but the weakness of relation between the parent
A and the child B makes them unavailable to the child.
The distinction between the human capital existing in
the family and the social capital existing in the family consti-
tutes the critical difference between what may be called the
"traditional disadvantage" of background and what I have
termed "family deficiencies." Disadvantaged background or-
dinarily refers to the absence of resources embodied in the
parents, represented primarily by the parents' education but
also by other variables, such as a low economic level or the
status of a racial-ethnic minority, which stand as surrogates
for low levels of human capital. By family deficiencies, I mean
the weakness of the links between the adult members of the
family and the children constituting an absence of social capi-
tal. If one considers the fourfold table as shown in Figure 7,
where the two dimensions are human capital and social capi-
tal, one can immediately see that there are families in all four
cells of the table. Cell 3 families include parents with low eco-
nomic and education levels, but with a strong set of relations
within the family, like the Asian immigrant families men-
tioned earlier. The families in cell 4 are poor, uneducated,
and disorganized, structurally weakened or broken by the
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personal disorganization of the parent or parents. In cell 1
the family possesses both human and social capital. The adult
members are educated and relations within the family are
strong. Parental resources are available to the children to en-
courage and aid their educational and social development.
The family type in cell 2 is becoming more prevalent today.
The adult members in cell 2 are well-educated, but, for a va-
riety of reasons (divorce, involvement with other adults in re-
lations that do not cross generations, exclusive attention to
self-development), the resources of the adults are not availa-
ble to promote the psychological health and the social and
educational development of the children.
Figure 7
Families Characterized by Presence or Absence of Human
Capital and Social Capital
Social Capital




advantage of Yes 1 2
background)
No 3 4
By confusing these two dimensions of family resources,
education policy has targeted children from families in cells 3
and 4. There has been little attention to children from fami-
lies in cell 2. Yet, as the research shows, students from fami-
lies in cell 2 have considerably lower rates of achievement
and considerably higher rates of dropout than children from
families in cell 1. It might well be the case, in fact, that chil-
dren from families in cell 3 (disadvantaged but strong fami-
lies) have fewer problems in school than those from cell 2
(advantaged but deficient families). That is, the social capital
of the family may be more influential than human capital in
the development of children.
Social Capital Beyond the Family
Beyond the social capital of the family are other forms of
social capital relevant to the child's development. The most
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striking instance of such social capital identified in our pre-
sent research was the social capital provided by the religious
community surrounding a religiously-based school. The social
capital for a young person's development is not contained in
the set of common values held by parents who choose to send
their children to the same private school. Social capital re-
sides in the functional community, the actual social relation-
ships that exist among parents, in the closure exhibited by
this structure of relations, and in the parent's relations with
the institutions of the community. Part of that social capital is
the set of norms that develop in communities with a high de-
gree of closure. If B and C represent students who see each
other every day in school and A and D are B's and C's par-
ents, respectively, then there is closure if the parents A and D
know each other and have some kind of ongoing relation.
The importance of this closure for the young persons in the
school, B and C, lies in the fact that only when A and D are
in some kind of ongoing relation can they establish norms
which shape and constrain the actions of B and C. In such a
structure relationships develop between one child and the
parent of another, as exemplified in Figure 6 by the links be-
tween A and C, and between D and B.
A social structure that does not exhibit closure is repre-
sented by Figure 8. Let us again assume that B and C are
students who know and see each other in school and A and D
are again the parents of B and C, respectively. If A's friend-
ships and daily contacts are with others (E) and D's contacts
are with a different set of others (F), then A and D are not in
a position to discuss their children's activities, develop com-
mon evaluations of these activities, and exercise sanctions
that guide and constrain these activities.
A D
E • 0 * F
B C
Figure 8
A Network Without Closure
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Figure 6 represents a structure with intergenerational clo-
sure, while Figure 8 represents a structure without in-
tergenerational closure. However much closure there may be
in the youth community among B and C, the absence of in-
tergenerational closure prevents the human capital that exists
among the adults from playing any role in the lives of the
youth. The lack of intergenerational closure constitutes the
missing social capital identified earlier as a cause of tangible
losses for young persons - the greater likelihood of drop-
ping out of school. The social capital of intergenerational clo-
sure exists in some isolated small towns and rural areas where
the social relations among adults are restricted by geographic
distance and residential mobility less important. Intergenera-
tional closure exists in schools based in a religious commu-
nity, such as Catholic schools, although the social relations
which make up the community are more narrowly focused
around a single dimension of social life, the religious institu-
tion. In rare circumstances intergenerational closure may ex-
ist for private schools without a religious base, as in the ex-
ample of a university laboratory school whose students are
children of faculty members who see each other at work and
live in the local neighborhood. This form of social capital
once existed for many public schools, for mothers worked in
the home and everyday contacts were largely with neighbors.
It may have once existed in elite private schools, when the
social elite whose children attended these schools constituted
a community with relatively concentrated social interactions.
But intergenerational closure does not now exist in most
modern public schools or in most non-religiously-based pri-
vate schools. The absence of intergenerational closure as a
form of social capital represents the loss of a resource for
young persons.
Social Capital as a Public Good
There is a property of social capital that differentiates it
from both physical capital and human capital. This property
of social capital has serious implications for the social, psy-
chological, and cognitive growth of young persons in the
United States. In western society in general, physical capital
is ordinarily a private good, in that the person who invests in
physical capital may capture the benefits produced by the
capital through his or her property rights in the capital. The
incentive to invest in physical capital is not depressed; there is
not a suboptimal investment in physical capital because those
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who invest in it are able to capture the benefits of their in-
vestments. For human capital (at least human capital of the
sort that is produced in schools), the person who invests the
time and resources in building up this capital reaps its bene-
fits in the form of a higher-paying job, more satisfying or
higher status work, or even the pleasure of greater under-
standing of the surrounding world - in short, all the bene-
fits that schooling brings to a person.
Social capital of the sort that is valuable for a young per-
son's education is not a private good. The kinds of social
structures which make social norms possible and the sanc-
tions that enforce them, do not benefit primarily the person
or persons whose efforts would be necessary to bring them
about. The benefits extend to all those who are part of such a
structure. For example, in schools where there are a dense
set of associations among parents, these associations are com-
monly the result of a small number of persons, ordinarily
mothers, who do not hold a full-time job outside the home.
These mothers themselves experience only a small part of the
benefits of the social capital surrounding the school. If one of
the mothers decides to abandon these activities, perhaps to
take a full-time job, the action may be entirely reasonable
from a personal point of view and even from the point of
view of that family itself. The benefits of the new activity to
the individual and to the family may far outweigh the losses
which arise from the decline in associations with other par-
ents whose children are in the school, but the withdrawal of
these activities constitutes a loss to all those other parents
whose associations and contacts were dependent on them.
Similarly, the decision to move from a community so that
one of the parents can accept a better job may be correct
from the point of view of that family. But because social capi-
tal consists of relations between persons, other persons may
experience extensive losses by the severance of those rela-
tions - a severance which they could not prevent. Part of the
loss is the weakening of norms and sanctions which aid the
school in its task. For each family, the total cost experienced
as a consequence of the decisions it and other families make
may outweigh the benefits of those few decisions it can con-
trol, and yet the beneficial consequences of those decisions
made by the family itself may far outweigh the minor losses
the family experiences from them alone.
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Social Capital and the Future for Youth
There are numerous implications of this analysis for the
future of youth and education in modern society. Two sets of
facts taken together suggest a future with special problems.
One set of facts, identified earlier, shows the importance of
social capital both within and outside the family, such as in
the religious community, for supporting the involvement of
youth in school. These results emphasize the importance of
the embeddedness of young persons in the world of the
adults closest to them; first, and most prominently, the fam-
ily, and, second, a surrounding community of adults (exem-
plified in these results by the religious community).
There is a second set of facts, but observable from social
trends. This is the declining embeddedness of youth in adult
enclaves; that is, in families and in intergenerational func-
tional communities. Such a decline in embeddedness comes
from two directions. The first is the decreased strength of
the institutions themselves, the family and the local commu-
nity (religiously-based, neighborhood-based, or otherwise).
"Modern family deficiencies" are growing rather rapidly, as
seen in the declining presence of both father and mother in
the household, through work in settings outside, and organi-
zationally distant from, the household. Much attention has
been directed to the recent rise in the percentage of women
working outside the home, but what is often forgotten is that
this exodus from the home merely follows (by about a hun-
dred years) that of the men. Figure 9 shows the proportion of
the male labor force engaged in agriculture (used as proxy
for men working in the household, though some non-farm
occupations were, especially in early days, in the household as
well) and the proportion of women not in the labor force
(i.e., in the household). These curves show a nearly parallel
pattern, with the process of flight from the home complete
for men and only partially completed for women. These
curves show that the household has been progressively de-
nuded of its adult members.
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Figure 9
PERCENT OF MALE LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE 1610-1982
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Other statistics point to the loss of social capital in the
household, such as the declining number of adults in the
household inhabited by the average American child - a de-
cline which first saw members of the extended family vanish,
and now sees one of the parents vanishing. Similar statistics
could be presented for the decline in adult social capital avail-
able to children in the community outside the family.
The decreased embeddedness of children in the family
and the community arises from other sources as well. The
increasing psychic involvement of the youth with the mass
media is intense only for a fraction of youth, but there has
been an extensive growth of the youth-oriented music indus-
try from rock and roll to rock music to rock video. MTV
(continuous rock video cable TV) is merely the most extreme
current expression.
Youth are pushed from psychic involvements with the
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family and the community, due to the reduced substance of
those institutions, and pulled by the mass media toward in-
volvements with the "persona" of the media. There are many
implications for such a movement, but one is of special con-
cern: the former institutions, whatever their failings in spe-
cific cases, supported and strengthened the formal educa-
tional institution in which children and youth are placed,
while the latter do not. The goals of education become in-
creasingly difficult to attain as the social base which supports
them comes to be less important in the lives of youth. Some-
thing must give, with the most likely change appearing to be
a radical transformation of the institutions into which chil-
dren are placed from the schools we now know to something
different.
What is Social Capital More Generally?
Before turning to the implications of social capital for
the law, it may be useful to go beyond the specific instance of
social capital described above. Social capital is, most gener-
ally, social organization, including both the informal organi-
zation of the sort described in the case of communities and
formal organization. The term "social capital" provides a
special focus that the more neutral term "social organiza-
tion" does not, for it focuses one's attention on the value of
social organization in aiding one to achieve goals. One of the
principal ways this value arises is through facilitating the pro-
vision of public goods; that is, goods which are not in the
interest of any individual to produce alone, but which, if pro-
vided, are of benefit to many. Social norms and the sanctions
that enforce them are one example of such a public good.
The ongoing social relations that enable one community
member to provide social support to another's child, which
induces the child to stay in school, is another example of a
public good.
But facilitating the provision of public goods or overcom-
ing the free rider problem is not the only value added by so-
cial capital. Trust and trustworthiness is an important form
of social capital which facilitates transactions. For example,
examination of the Japanese automobile industry has made a
number of things apparent. First, Japanese auto manufactur-
ers are able to reduce costs by near-absence of vertical inte-
gration. In manufacturing itself, the auto manufacturers are
little more than assemblers, with component parts made by
supplier firms operating with lower wages and with prices
[Vol. 3
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held down by market competition. Second, the Japanese auto
manufacturers forego vertical integration principally because
they are able to obtain the benefits it provides for American
firms (control over quality and the scheduling of supply) with-
out the integration itself and the costs accompanying such in-
tegration. Third, these benefits are made possible because of
the much closer relations of trust that exist in Japan between
supplier and consumer firms. The economic impact of those
trust relations turns out to be very great indeed.
Implications for Law
Social capital does not arise automatically, nor does it
arise through the incentives of the people it benefits. Social
capital differs from human capital in that the value it pro-
duces is in the form of public goods, and the individuals cre-
ating the social capital often cannot capture this value.
At times, however, the creators of social capital can real-
ize its value, and the conditions under which this is true can
be instructive about the implications of these matters for the
law. The most straightforward illustration of the ability to
capture the value created by social capital is the business firm
which produces a tangible good. Because the firm has prop-
erty rights to the goods it produces, and the law establishes
and enforces those property rights, an entrepreneur with an
idea for a product has the incentive to bring into being an
organization that can convert the idea into a product. He has
an incentive to create social capital because property rights
make it possible for him to capture the value created by the
organization. If he were unable to do so, there would be a
serious underinvestment in the social capital necessary to
bring socially useful products into being. The inability to cap-
ture the value created may arise from legal or logistical
sources. In some socialist countries, the legal constraints on
exchange of labor for wages, unless the exchange is with the
state, makes it illegal for a potential entrepreneur to employ
more than a small number of persons in a productive enter-
prise. This is an example of a legal barrier.
An example of logistical barriers to investment in social
capital is provided by the case of an intangible product, such
as an idea. Here, although the legal principles governing
property rights remain approximately the same as for tangi-
ble products, both the problem of applying those principles in
specific cases (for example, whether a purported new idea is
in fact new, and when a purported independent discovery is
1988]
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in fact independent) and the problem of enforcing the rights
(for, unlike a tangible good which is stolen, a stolen idea or
piece of information is not found to be missing by its original
owner, but appears to be untouched). Patent copyright laws
provide special legal protection of property rights to certain
intangibles because the problems of applying and enforcing
rights over intangibles is a difficult one. Thus, even those
forms of social capital that can be brought into being by en-
trepreneurs through the exchange of wages for work cannot
always capture the value of their products and will thus not
come into being, unless some way around the difficulty is
found.
This contrast, between the business organization that can
ordinarily capture the value of the product it produces, and
informal social organization that cannot, shows the impor-
tance of the legal allocation of rights in the creation of social
capital. If a business organization did not have property
rights to both the product it produces and the processes by
which it produces them (so long as those processes are
unique), there would be a serious underinvestment in this
form of social capital.
Of course, this is exactly the state of affairs for other
forms of social capital, such as that provided by a community
surrounding a school or by a family into which a child is
born. In these voluntary organizations and associations,
where the social capital is created largely as a by-product of
individuals' actions carried out for other purposes, there is no
legal allocation of rights to help insure their coming into be-
ing. This class of social capital is distinguished from the
others by a single criterion: the creation of these forms of
social capital does not occur as a result of the allocation of
property rights, as in the case of business organizations, but
occurs as a by-product of actions taken by individuals for
other purposes.
The law has less apparent and less clear-cut consequences
for these sources of social capital; nevertheless, there are con-
sequences. Consider the kinds of communities that have
shown themselves to provide extensive social capital for
young persons in high school; that is, religious communities.
The establishment clause and constitutional provision for the
separation of church and state, as interpreted by the courts,
has inhibited the employment of that social capital toward
the education of the young and indirectly diminished its
quantity in so doing. This has very likely not only skewed so-
ciety's resources away from education of the young, but also
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had a regressive effect on the distribution of educational re-
sources by selectively harming the education of poor chil-
dren, since the poor and lower middle classes make more use
of religion and religious institutions than do the upper mid-
dle and upper classes.
Other values may bring about such legal restraints: the
framers of the Constitution were confronted with examples
of religious intolerance in European states with state-sup-
ported religions; and they could see the dangers of non-sepa-
ration. It is important to recognize, however, just what costs
each legal principle entails. In the case of this principle, one
of the important costs is paid by the young through the un-
deremployment of the social capital inherent in religious
groups toward education.
The overall problem is still more serious in the emerging
society of the future. This is the problem of whether there
will be a wholesale destruction of the informal sources of so-
cial capital which arise as by-products of actions engaged in
for other purposes. The most important such form for pro-
ducing the next generation is the family. Adults who become
parents perform two kinds of acts that are critical for the
next generation in society. First, they give birth to a child.
Second, they devote time and attention to the development
of the child. Throughout history (until the advent of effective
contraceptive methods), the first of these actions, giving
birth, was a necessary by-product of sexual activity engaged
in largely for pleasure. The second of these actions, devoting
time and attention to development of the child, were histori-
cally actions for which parents could capture much of the
benefit. Parents were able to capture the benefits of their
child-raising in three ways: First, parents were ordinarily able
to use their children for labor, either in farm labor or in
child labor in early industry. Second, children were responsi-
ble for the care of their aged dependent parents, on one or
both sides of the family in most societies. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, the relevant unit whose interests parents
were attempting to further was the "family," regarded as a
multi-generational unit with historical continuity and an exis-
tence extending forward into the future. To invest time, at-
tention, and resources in a child was to invest time, attention,
and resources in the family to insure its future well-being.
Families with less tradition and pride made lesser investments
in their children, .but, on the whole, the central place of the
family as the primary social unit, not only of consumption but
of production, meant that the strength and continuity of the
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family constituted a matter of major importance to its adult
members. The historical evidence of life in pre-modern Eu-
rope provides an image of society in which the individual,
with distinctive individual interests and tastes, was greatly
overshadowed by the family and those associations and collec-
tive bodies which grew out of it.
This primacy of the family, abetted by the legal alloca-
tion to parents of property rights over their children, meant
that the family was able to capture a large portion of the ben-
efits of its investments in children. There was no problem of
incentives, no question of where the enormous investments of
time and energy of an adult population necessary to bring a
new generation into responsible adulthood would originate.
These investments would be made primarily by the parents,
and, secondarily, by the members of the extended fam-
ily-grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins.
Today, we are at a point where the question is no longer
easily solved. The social capital within and surrounding the
family, which was once both rich and available for aiding the
growth and development of children, is rapidly being dissi-
pated. The fundamental reason lies in the changed status of
"the family" as a social unit with historical continuity ex-
tending into the future. It is no longer the entity whose inter-
ests its members aim to realize, no longer as central to their
lives as it once was. This means that adult family members
have less reason to invest resources in their children and
more reason to invest those resources in satisfying their own
individual interests.
To chronicle how this came about, how the erosion of
the concept of the family as the basic building block on which
all larger institutions were constructed, would lead far afield.
It is sufficient to say here that the process began first in four-
teenth century England with the legal recognition of new
kinds of actors in society, the "fictional persons" or "juristic
persons." In contrast to "natural persons,"1 these fictional
persons (or corporate actors) were in the first instance towns.
The towns were chartered by the king, could sue and be
sued, had a treasury that did not belong to any or all of the
town's burgesses, and were recognized as legal persons.
Later, the great trading companies, such as the East India
Company and the Virginia Company, were included in the
1. F. Maitland has described this process in some detail, in TRUST
AND CORPORATION (1904), and in F. Pollock and F. Maitland, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWS (1898).
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definition. These new forms of organizations, these corporate
actors from which modern joint-stock corporations have
grown, made possible the social capital that brought the In-
dustrial Revolution to England. These precursors of the mod-
ern corporation slowly but steadily drove the family from its
central place in society to the periphery, where it now rests.
The family has been replaced by the modern corporation as
the central social unit of society; the social unit within which
first men, and now women, carry out their daily productive
activities and find their psychological home.
These new forms of social capital, whose very existence
were established by the legal resolution of various questions
concerning rights (the most important of which are probably
the principle of limited liability of owners and the principle
that corporate actors are "persons" before the law), have
been extraordinarily important for the development of what
we see as the modern world. It could be well argued that the
Industrial Revolution was not a revolution brought about by
technological inventions such as the steam engine, but a
revolution brought about by a social invention, the legal or
fictional person, which developed in English common law of
the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries.
The full working-out of that social (or legal) invention
has only come about in our age. First the corporation ab-
sorbed the interests, time, attention, and investments of men;
more recently, it has come to absorb the interests and atten-
tion of women as well. The cost has been borne by the tradi-
tional bodies that it replaced in the minds and hearts of the
society's adults - the family, the extended family, the com-
munity, and the religious group. The cost has also been im-
posed on those who remain outside of it, for the modern cor-
poration is not an encompassing institution like the family,
with a place for everyone, whether they be old, young, handi-
capped, retarded, insane, unmarried, or invalid. The modern
corporation is an institution that maximizes internal welfare
but has no responsibility for what is outside of it. One might
well say that the same was true of the family, but the crucial
difference lies in the fact that every person is born into a fam-
ily. By virtue of one's birth one acquired a "birthright" of
nonrevocable family membership. Attachment to a modern
corporation is, in contrast, instantly revocable and never
lifelong.
The question arises for modern society, how will these
unproductive members of society be accommodated? Will the
city streets be increasingly populated by bag ladies and home-
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less men? And, whatever a society does with the old, the in-
sane, and the retarded, the society that fails to nurture its
young into effective adulthood is doomed to quick oblivion.
The responsibility for these unproductive members of
society, a responsibility that was taken by the family and im-
mediately surrounding community when these institutions
were in full health, has increasingly come to be taken by the
state. This has proven to be a defective solution, however,
largely because the capacity of the state to take financial re-
sponsibility for these dependent persons is not matched by
the social capital necessary to implement this responsibility.
In particular, the withering away of the family as the princi-
pal agent for the socialization of children is not paralleled by
the growth of another institution with the incentive to make
investments that aid the growth and development of chil-
dren. What has replaced the family in the attention of young
persons is a society of peers, as well as certain activities that
are attentive to the short-term and immediate interests of the
young, such as the popular music industry, a segment of the
fashion industry, and even the alcohol and drug industry. But
the incentives that govern these industries can hardly be said
to coincide with the long-term interests of the young.
The school is an institution constructed to aid the
growth and development of the young, but the school is only
a partial institution, fulfilling certain limited tasks well as a
supplement to strong families. The school has not ordinarily
been successful for children whose families are not strong,
and neither has it done well in the competition for attention
of the young against the youth-oriented commercial en-
tertainment mentioned earlier.
Reallocation of Rights
The allocation of rights is the single most important con-
tributor to the creation or destruction of social capital; more
particularly, the allocation of rights to individuals and to vari-
ous kinds of corporate bodies makes a critical difference in
the creation and destruction of social capital.
Whatever the legal allocation of rights, the changes in
social structures over time bring about a shift of de facto
rights from some actors in society to other actors. For exam-
ple, the general shift from the production of other goods by
small enterprises in the nineteenth century to massive corpo-
rations in the second half of the twentieth century has meant
a drift of defacto rights from the consumer to the producer; a
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drift that is reflected in such things as the control of produc-
ers over most of the information surrounding the producer-
consumer relation through advertising and market research.
The drift of de facto rights among four actors in modern
society-the state, the individual, the corporation, and the
family-is represented in Figure 10. The drift toward the
corporation and the state are due in part to their growth in
size and in part to changes in the social structure of activities,
with many activities shifting from informal or non-monetarily
compensated actions to those involving explicit exchanges in-
volving money. The family has shrunk in size over the same
period of time due to the declining continuity over genera-
tions and declining membership, while the individual has, of
course, remained the same. The drift from the family to the
corporation has arisen principally through the movement of
the locus of work from home to corporation and, most re-
cently, the increasing movement of consumption activities,
such as eating, from the home to the corporation, from the
family kitchen to McDonald's. Even the increase in the per-
centages of high school students who work part-time demon-
strates the drift from family to corporation, for income
earned from work is used by the youths to purchase commer-
cial entertainment and goods. The commercial activity of
youths replaces the family-centered activities, of which young
persons were once part.
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Drift of De Facto Rights Among Actors
The drift in the distribution of de facto rights has
profound consequences for the reservoir of social capital
available to the young, for that social capital resides primarily
in the family and derivatives of the family , such as the local
community. Figure 10 suggests that each of the drifts con-
cerning the family have been away: to the state, to the corpo-
ration, and to the individual. Some of these drifts are en-
couraged by the reduced capacity of the family to take
responsibility for its dependent members, for rights ordina-
rily accompany responsibilities as traveling companions.
A drift of de facto rights from one actor to another is not
the only process, however, through which rights come to be
reallocated in society. Another device for reallocation of
rights occurs through legal reallocation, as some actors use
the law to counter the drift of defacto rights away from them.
Figure 11 shows my conception of the legal reallocation of
rights in recent years. A double arrow indicates that there
has been legal reallocation of rights in both directions. A
number of these reallocations have been from the state or
corporation to the individual, many occurring in the 1970s as
part of a revolt against the drift of rights to the corporation
and the state. The Freedom of Information Act of 1974 and
a number of other statutes have had as their principal intent
[Vol. 3
CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
a reallocation of rights back to the individual, in this case a







Legal Reallocations of Rights Among Actors
At the same time, there has been a continued realloca-
tion of certain rights away from the individual and family to-
ward the state. Some of those reallocations away from the in-
dividual may be seen as an attempt on the part of the state to
alter the balance of rights among individuals by constraining
the actions of individuals which might hurt or offend other
individuals, such as statutes against burning leaves, proscrip-
tions against smoking in certain public places, seat belt laws,
and the like. The reallocation of rights away from the family
is somewhat more complex. The principle of in loco parentis,
under which public school authorities have traditionally oper-
ated, has been replaced by the principle that the student has
full civil rights, thus requiring the procedures of due process.
While this change arose as a means of protecting the rights of
individual students vis-a-vis the school, it represented a subtle
change in the conception of the rights of the authority over
the school-age child, from rights held by the family toward
rights held by the child himself. Similar changes are reflected
in the area of allowing teen-age children still attending high
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school to receive support from their parents while living sep-
arately from the parent(s).
The growth of physical and sexual abuse cases against
parents also reflects acquisition of power by the state over
children at expense of the parents. These shifts, as in the
other reallocations, are away from a conception of the child
as a minor subject to parental authority and toward a concep-
tion of the child as a citizen with full civil rights, subject only
to the authority of the state itself. One might well regard
these reallocations as a part of a broader reallocation of
rights away from the intermediate bodies in society toward
the individual and the state, resulting in an increasing per-
centage of the rights in society being held by individuals qua
individuals or by the state. If this is the case, one is reminded
of an earlier period in history, at the end of the Middle Ages,
when intermediate bodies lost power and that power flowed
to individuals and the King.'
I have deferred until this point a comment on one arrow
in Figure 11, the one reallocation that is in the direction of
the family: from corporation to family. Individuals have come
to gain increased rights in their relations with the corpora-
tions that employ them in their capacity as parents or pro-
spective parents. Such rights as the right to parental leave,
first for women and now, in some cases, for men; the in-
creased rights to flexible working hours that are ordinarily
used to carry out family activities; and the introduction of
daycare centers by some firms are instances of this form of
reallocation. Most of these changes have arisen as a result of
the increased participation of women in the labor force. The
reallocation of rights from the corporation to the family rep-
resents an accommodation on the part of corporations to the
fact that, with both parents now absent from the home dur-
ing working hours, some adjustments are necessary if
parenthood is to continue as a viable activity. There are
other adjustments which reduce the incidence or strength of
the parental role (and thus reduce the social capital available
to children), including increasing numbers of married couples
deciding not to become parents, and the increased use of day
care and after-school facilities to accommodate to single par-
ents and working parents.
Where does all of this leave us with respect to the ques-
tion of social capital available to the child? There seems to be
a continuing destruction of this social capital, tempered only
2. See W. ULLMAN, THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(1966).
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by a few moves in the other direction. What kinds of changes
are there, or what kind could there come to be, to recreate
social capital available to children? I cannot here, because of
the limitation of space, do more than point to possible
changes, but even to point may be useful. One kind of
change can be seen by reference again to Figures 10 and 11,
and back to Figure 8: Figure 10 and 11 showed a drift of
rights and legal reallocations of rights almost entirely away
from the family. It is possible that some reallocations may
come to be in the other direction. Perhaps the most promis-
ing is a strengthening of the currently small flow of rights
from corporation back to the family, through growth of
rights of employees in their capacities as parents or prospec-
tive parents.
Going back to Figure 8, showing the absence of in-
tergenerational closure of social networks among parents,
changes are possible which help bring closure to these net-
works. Schools, for example, can - and some already have
- bring parents together to solve problems that have arisen
among their children: drug use, delinquency actions, teen-age
pregnancy, suicide. The school can thus help bring about the
intergenerational closure that facilitates parents' ability to es-
tablish and enforce norms for their children.
The second kind of change involves the construction of
new and different institutions that can provide social capital
for the young. I will have even less to say about this, but will
give an example which will illustrate how different this direc-
tion of change is from the changes that aim to reinforce the
family. One can say, "So if the central activities, time, and
interest of adults in society have vanished into the corpora-
tion, why not let the young follow their parents?" Women
have followed men into the corporation, and the reasonable
next step is for children to follow their parents. How might
this be done? Through two devices: first, a legal requirement
that all firms above a given number of employees in size be-
come age-balanced organizations, having an age structure ap-
proximating that in society, including the two ages of depen-
dency, the young and the old; and second, redirection to the
corporation of the taxes which the state currently uses to
take responsibility for dependent age groups. It then would
become the responsibility of the organization, using family
relationships or not as it desired, to educate and socialize its
young members, and to care for its aged.
This change is one which in effect accepts the new cor-
porate structure of modern society and merely extends it to
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provide for continuation of the society through generations.
It is based on the assumption that the old forms, family and
community, cannot be satisfactorily revived, and that the so-
ciety of the future must create social capital for the young
that is organizationally consistent with the new kinds of cor-
porate actors that have become the dominant form in society.
Altogether, what I have tried to do in this paper is to
show the effects on high school students of social capital in
the family and in the community, to show how that capital
comes into being and how it can be destroyed, and to show
how some of the redistributions of rights in society act to de-
stroy social capital of the family. Finally, I have suggested di-
rections that change might reasonably take.
